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ABSTRACT 
This article compares the law and practice of the European Union and Australia in respect to 
the search and rescue (SAR) of boat migrants, concluding that the response to individuals in peril at 
sea in both jurisdictions is becoming increasingly securitized. This has led to the humanitarian purpose 
of SAR being compromised in the name of border security. Part I contrasts the unique challenge posed 
by SAR operations involving migrants and asylum seekers, as opposed to other people in distress at 
sea. Part II analyses the relevant international legal regime governing SAR activities and its operation 
among European States and in offshore Australia. Part III introduces the securitization framework as 
the explanatory paradigm for shifting State practice and its impact in Europe and Australia. It then 
examines the consequences of increasing securitization of SAR in both jurisdictions and identifies 
common trends, including an increase in militarization and criminalisation, a lack of transparency and 
accountability, developments relating to disembarkation and non-refoulement, and challenges 
relating to cooperation and commodification. 
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I. A TALE OF TWO RESCUES 
In 1997, two competitors in the Vendee Globe round-the-world solo yachting race capsized in 
the Southern Ocean after encountering tumultuous seas and severe gales. The sailors—one a 
Frenchman (Thierry Dubois), the other an Englishman (Tony Bullimore)—were 2,500 km from 
Australian shores when they activated their distress beacons. A search and rescue (SAR) operation 
ensued, involving two ships from the Royal Australian Navy and six aircraft from the Royal Australian 
Air Force, with hundreds of defence and civilian personnel also pressed into service.1 In an operation 
estimated to have cost over AUD 6 million,2 the lone sailors were rescued after four days and brought 
to safety in Australia. 
Contrast this with a situation that arose in the Mediterranean in 2009, when two boats carrying 
154 migrants, mainly Sub-Saharan Africans, began to take on water. The MV Pinar, a Turkish cargo 
vessel passing nearby, was diverted to rescue the survivors, some 76 km from the Italian island of 
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1 M Daly, ‘A Race against Time and Ocean’ The Age (Melbourne, 11 January 1997) 15. 
2 F Ogilvie, ‘Tony Bullimore Sets Sail Alone on another Extreme Challenge’ ABC (Online, 1 May 2007) 
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Lampedusa and 211 km from Malta.3 However, there was uncertainty as to where the rescuees should 
be landed. A four-day standoff ensued between Italy and Malta, as each alleged that the other State 
was responsible for accepting the migrants.4 Italy’s claim was based on the location of the incident 
within Malta’s SAR zone; while Malta’s claim was based on the closer proximity of Italian territory. 
Against the backdrop of ongoing irregular maritime flows from North Africa to Europe, it was clear 
that neither country wanted to accept the rescuees. Eventually, Italy relented on humanitarian 
grounds and permitted the Pinar to make landfall in Sicily, but not before one migrant had died on 
board the rescue vessel and another had to be airlifted because of a medical emergency. 
The differences between these scenarios are stark, but not because they pit a benign 
Antipodean attitude to those in peril at sea against a malign European one. Indeed, Australia was itself 
heavily criticised for its own Pinar-like incident when in 2001 it refused to accept 433 asylum seekers 
rescued by a Norwegian vessel (MV Tampa) in international waters, within Indonesia’s SAR zone but 
just 140 km from the Australian territory of Christmas Island.5 
Although the Vendee Globe and Pinar events activate similar international legal obligations, 
they also highlight practical differences that arise from the number of persons in need of rescue; their 
nationality and migration status; their likelihood of claiming international protection as refugees; the 
antecedent history of rescues at sea; and the domestic political consequences of benevolence towards 
boat migrants. The application of overlapping legal regimes, together with uncertainties in the rights 
and obligations of affected States and individuals, has created opportunities for disparate responses.6 
As one author remarked, ‘coastal States are more open to accept those less in need of refuge in the 
certain knowledge that they can easily be repatriated, whereas those most in need of refuge will be 
spurned as a potential burden’.7  
This article examines the shift that has occurred in the European Union (EU) and Australia from 
a fundamentally humanitarian mission of SAR to a complex, securitized response to boat migration. 
The result is a situation in which the humanitarian purpose of SAR has become compromised in the 
name of border security with ensuing consequences. On this basis, Part II examines the core 
humanitarian dimensions of SAR under international law generally and its operation within the EU and 
in Australia. Part III introduces the securitization framework and its ramifications for the shift in 
approaches to SAR in each region. It then analyses the consequences of increasing securitization of 
SAR in both jurisdictions. These include an increase in militarization, lack of transparency and 
accountability, developments relating to disembarkation and non-refoulement, criminalisation, 
commodification, and impediments to effective cooperation. The article concludes with some 
recommendations and suggestions for future research. Throughout the article we use the term ‘boat 
migrant’ to refer to (forced) migrants and asylum seekers voyaging by sea. It is significant to note that 
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Rights Abuses in the Mediterranean’ (2010) 40 Cal W Int'l LJ 335; S Klepp, ‘A Double Bind: Malta and 
the Rescue of Unwanted Migrants at Sea, a Legal Anthropological Perspective on the Humanitarian Law 
of the Sea’ (2011) 23 IJRL 538, 547. 
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7 R Barnes, ‘Refugee Law at Sea’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 47, 49. 
the overwhelming majority of those travelling to Europe and Australia, during the time that 
approaches to SAR were revised, have been found to be refugees.8 
II. SHIFTING LEGAL REGIMES FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE AT SEA 
The international laws that regulate maritime search and rescue are today a large canvas of 
overlapping treaty regimes. The most important regimes, chronologically, are the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention),9 the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (SAR Convention),10 and the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).11 Each has garnered substantial acceptance by the international 
community—the SOLAS Convention presently has 162 parties; the SAR Convention has 107 parties; 
and UNCLOS has 168 parties.12 Australia is party to all three conventions. The EU and all its Member 
States are party to UNCLOS and are thus respectively responsible for matters over which each has 
competence under EU law—which excludes SAR in relation to the Union, as further discussed below.13 
All EU Member States have ratified the SOLAS Convention, and all but three Member States are party 
to the SAR Convention.14 Gaps in the universal coverage of the conventions still leave scope for the 
operation of customary international law,15 which also recognises a legal obligation to rescue a person 
in distress at sea.16  
                                                 
8  In Australia, between 70 and 100 per cent of asylum seekers arriving by boat in recent years have been 
found to be refugees: J Phillips, ‘Asylum Seekers and Refugee: What Are the Facts?’ (2015) Australian 
Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series 2014-15, 9. In the EU, the top boat migrant nationalities 
(i.e. Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi) are also the top nationalities of registered asylum seekers and recognised 
refugees in EU-28. Combine: EUROSTAT, Asylum Quarterly Report (15 March 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report>; with IOM, 
Missing Migrants Project – Migration Flows: Europe <http://migration.iom.int/europe/>. Note also that 
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12 ‘Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of which the International Maritime 
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of the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement of 28 
July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof [1998] OJ L179/1. 
14  The three EU member states which have not ratified the SAR Convention are Austria, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. It is important to note that all three are landlocked and hence have no 
responsibility over SAR regions: IMO Status of Ratifications (n 12).  
15  RR Churchill and A Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 1999) 7–12; D 
Rothwell and T Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Hart 2016) 22–3. 
16  DP O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press 1982) 813–14; G Goodwin-Gill and J 
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 2007) 278; M Pallis, ‘Obligations 
of States towards Asylum Seekers at Sea: Interactions and Conflicts between Legal Regimes’ (2002) 14 
IJRL 329, 333-4.  
The Mediterranean has long been the locus for SAR activities in Europe, although the crisis is 
more widespread.17 In 2015, the number of arrivals peaked, with more than a million persons reaching 
the EU by sea, and nearly 4,000 perishing en route. While the number of arrivals dropped to just over 
356,000 the following year, the rate of dead and missing increased to more than 5,000.18 This is a 
significant proportion of the 7,763 total migrant deaths worldwide for the same period.19 It is only 
since the implementation of the so-called EU-Turkey ‘deal’ of March 2016 that the Aegean route has 
been sealed.20 Cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard thereafter,21 combining SAR with anti-
smuggling operations,22 has also translated in reduced crossings through the Central Mediterranean.23  
Australia’s experience of boat migration is modest when compared to Europe. A little over 
60,000 people have arrived in Australia by boat without authorization since 2000.24 The number of 
arrivals peaked in 2013 at 20,587.25 The subsequent introduction of a suite of restrictive border control 
measures has reduced the number to close to zero.26 A small number of vessels continue to attempt 
the journey to Australia but are intercepted and deflected at sea, either to their point of departure, 
or to one of Australia’s offshore regional processing facilities in Nauru or on Papua New Guinea’s 
Manus Island.27 Estimating the number of migrants who have died at sea while attempting to make 
the journey to Australia is a contentious issue, with claims that the government at times may have 
inflated the numbers in order to justify its harsh deterrence policies.28 There is no doubting, however, 
that there has been significant loss of life at sea, with one independent monitoring body estimating 
just over 1,900 deaths since January 2000.29 
Although European States and Australia are bound by key international legal obligations 
associated with SAR, their respective experiences with boat migrants have triggered responses 
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24  Migrant Smuggling Working Group, ‘Statistics relating to Migrant Smuggling in Australia’ (University 
of Queensland, TC Beirne School of Law, 24 Mar 2017) <https://law.uq.edu.au/research/our-
research/migrant-smuggling-working-group/statistics-relating-migrant-smuggling-australia>.  
25  J Phillips, ‘Boat Arrivals and Boat “Turnbacks” in Australia since 1976: A Quick Guide to the Statistics’ 
(2017) (Australian Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series 2016-17). 
26  Ibid. 
27  See (n 210) and related discussion. 
28  G Nakhoul, Overboard: You Would Not Believe what Really Triggered Australia's Controversial Policy 
on Boat People (Dar Meera 2011). 
29  Border Crossing Observatory, ‘Australian Border Deaths Database’ (March 2017) 
<http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/publications/australian-border-deaths-
database/>. 
intended to enhance their border security. This Part highlights the central obligations associated with 
SAR but indicates a shift in State practice in the interpretation and application of these international 
norms. The first section sets out the humanitarian purpose underpinning the international legal 
regime in place for SAR, which binds EU Member States and Australia. It then assesses the European 
approach to SAR, noting the increasing role played by the EU via its external frontiers agency, the 
European Border and Coastguard (‘the EU Coastguard’, also known as ‘Frontex’), in border 
management.30 The third section assesses the Australian approach to SAR, which demonstrates a 
conflation of humanitarian norms of SAR with border security imperatives.  
A. Humanitarian Dimensions of the International Legal Regime for SAR 
The foundations of SAR may be seen in early Judeo Christian writings,31 and were expounded 
by the earliest scholars of international law.32 The current manifestation of this humanitarian 
obligation is the legal requirement enshrined in Article 98(1) of UNCLOS. This article provides that 
every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag to (a) assist any person found at sea in 
danger of being lost, and (b) proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. By 
its terms, the obligation falls on the flag State to require a master, through domestic legislation, to 
take action in specific circumstances. In practice, the obligation is discharged by individuals (masters) 
who may have to interrupt their commercial voyages to attend to those in need. The beneficiaries of 
the obligation are persons in ‘danger’ or ‘distress’; and the nature of the obligation is to ‘render 
assistance’ and ‘rescue’. However, the absence of definitions of these terms has left room for 
disputation, particularly as to when a rescue operation is required and when it is completed.33 The 
obligations are not absolute: a master is not required to seriously endanger his ship, crew or 
passengers; nor to do more than may ‘reasonably be expected’. 
In addition to the obligations that fall on flag States, coastal States have obligations that extend 
beyond the mere making of laws. By Article 98(2), coastal States must promote the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of ‘an adequate and effective search and rescue service’ regarding safety 
at sea, and must cooperate with neighbouring States where required.34 Under the SAR Convention, 
States are required to participate in the development of SAR services ‘to ensure that assistance is 
rendered to any person in distress at sea’, and they must also establish SAR regions by agreement with 
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31  M Rader, ‘The “Good Samaritan” in Jewish Law’ (2001) 22 J Leg Med, 375. 
32  For example, de Vattel claimed that ‘to give assistance in such extreme necessity is so essentially 
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polish of civilisation’: E de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to 
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33  For a discussion of the politics of interpretation, see T Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Perfect Storm: 
Sovereignty Games and the Law and Politics of Boat Migration’ in V Moreno-Lax and E Papastavridis 
(eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach. Integrating Maritime Security 
with Human Rights (Brill 2016) 60, 66; Arguing for a wide construction of the term ‘distress’ see L 
Komp, ‘The Duty to Assist Persons in Distress: An Alternative Source of Protection against the Return 
of Migrants and Asylum Seekers to the High Seas?’ in Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat 
Refugees’ (above) 222.  
34  The SOLAS Convention contains a provision akin to art 98(2) of UNCLOS. See SOLAS Convention, 
Annex, ch 5 reg 15(a). These arrangements are to include maritime safety facilities adequate for the 
location and rescue of such persons. 
other States.35 Pursuant to this obligation, the world’s oceans have been divided into multiple SAR 
regions, with responsibility assigned to proximate coastal States. Australia, for example, has a SAR 
region of some 53,000,000 km2, covering one-tenth of the world’s surface, and bordering the SAR 
regions of ten other countries.36 In Europe, coastal States at both sides of the Mediterranean cover 
the entirety of the sea’s extension—except for the waters close to Libya, which has no operative SAR 
region.37 
Under the SOLAS Convention, a State party is required to regulate the activities of all ships flying 
its flag regardless of where they sail,38 and to provide for the rescue of persons in distress at sea 
‘around its coasts’, without limit as to distance or maritime zone.39 Yet despite this apparent breadth, 
there are longstanding gaps in treaty law that give ‘some leeway for political expediency’.40 Notably, 
the Annex to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as originally concluded, imposed an obligation on a master 
of a ship ‘to proceed with all speed to the assistance of…persons in distress’.41 The beneficiaries of the 
obligation are persons in ‘distress’ (not danger) on a ship or survival craft, and the obligation is limited 
to giving assistance (not rescue). Like Article 98(a) of UNCLOS, the obligation is not absolute: a master’s 
obligation arises only upon receiving a distress signal, and does not extend to giving assistance 
considered to be unreasonable or unnecessary. 42  
A key obligation in place under the SAR Convention since its inception in 1979 is that States 
must ensure that assistance is provided to any person in distress at sea ‘regardless of the nationality 
status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found’.43 The 1998 revisions to 
the SAR Convention also contain definitions of ‘search’ and ‘rescue’.44 ‘Search’ is an operation to locate 
persons in distress, and ‘rescue’ is an operation ‘to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial 
medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety’. A ‘place of safety’, however, is not 
                                                 
35 SAR Convention, Annex, [2.1.1], [2.1.4]. 
36 Australian Maritime Safety Authority, ‘Australia’s Search and Rescue Region’ (Australian Government) 
<https://www.amsa.gov.au/search-and-rescue/australias-search-and-rescue-system/australia-
srr/index.asp>.  
37 For a map of the SAR zones, see European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), Irregular Migration via the 
Mediterranean: From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions, Issue 22 (February 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean_en>; 
See also S Trevisanut, ‘Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of Cooperation or 
Conflict?’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 523, Annexes I-II.  
38 SOLAS Convention, art II. 
39 SOLAS Convention, Annex, ch 5 reg 15(a); M Pallis (n 16) 335. Note, however, that SOLAS generally 
does not apply to public vessels such as warships and coast guard vessels participating in operations 
described in this article: SOLAS Convention, reg 3(a)(i). 
40 M Pugh, ‘Drowning Not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea (2004) 17 JRS 50, 60; See 
also V Moreno-Lax, The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (Mal)practice in Europe and 
Australia, Kaldor Centre Policy Brief No. 4 (May 2017). 
41 SOLAS Convention, Annex, ch 5 reg 10(a); Strictly speaking, however, a State’s international legal 
obligations arise from the requirement in art 1(b) to promulgate all laws necessary to give full and 
complete effect to the instrument and its Annex. 
42 This does not mean that there are no other relevant obligations, eg, flowing from the right to life under 
human rights law, enjoining States to do everything within their power to preserve human life. On the 
extent of positive duties arising from the intersection between SAR and human rights law, see Komp, n 
(n 33).  
43 SAR Convention, Annex, [2.1.10]. 
44 SAR Convention, Annex, [1.3]. 
defined, and it is clear from other provisions that disembarkation lies in the discretion of the coastal 
State.45 
Concerns about the definition of distress as well as ambiguity about when rescue is completed 
prompted a dialogue between States and international organizations to provide greater certainty for 
stakeholders.46 In 2004, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) issued Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea (IMO Guidelines)47 and amended the SOLAS Convention, with 
operative effect from 2006.48 The treaty amendments clarify the master’s duty to provide assistance 
to persons in distress. That duty is now expressed to apply ‘regardless of the nationality or status of 
such persons or the circumstances in which they are found’, and requires the master to treat rescuees 
‘with humanity, within the capabilities and limitations of the ship’. Additional amendments address 
the issue of disembarkation, somewhat elliptically. State parties are now obliged to cooperate to 
ensure that masters are relieved of their obligations to assist ‘with minimum further deviation from 
the ship’s intended voyage’. The State responsible for search and rescue in that region is given 
‘primary responsibility’ to ensure that assisted survivors are disembarked and delivered to a place of 
safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case.49 Some commentators have 
argued that the State coordinating the search and rescue has a residual obligation to allow 
disembarkation on its territory, if safe disembarkation elsewhere is not possible, but the issue is 
contentious.50 
The Guidelines provide direction as to what ‘a place of safety’ is, but in terms that are 
themselves imprecise.51 A place of safety is a location where rescue operations are considered to 
terminate, and where the basic human needs of survivors to food, shelter, and medical treatment can 
be met. At first blush, this sounds like a location on land, but the Guidelines recognise that, at least ad 
interim, it may also be a location at sea, such as a rescue vessel, until the survivors are disembarked 
to their next destination. Yet the Guidelines also state that ‘an assisting ship should not be considered 
a place of safety based solely on the fact that the survivors are no longer in immediate danger once 
aboard the ship’.52 Significantly, the Guidelines also stipulate that asylum seekers rescued at sea 
should not be disembarked in territories where they may face a well-founded fear of persecution.53 
While the purport of these legal obligations is clear, there is sufficient obfuscation in the terms to 
allow for varied implementation by States. 
B. European Approach to ‘Incidental SAR’ and its Subsumption in Border Control 
The international SAR framework applies fully to EU Member States, which retain distinct 
responsibility for rescue at sea. Only Malta objected to the latest SAR revisions at the IMO—with that, 
                                                 
45 SAR Convention, Annex, [3.1]; For example, States are required to co-operate for the purpose of 
allowing another State entry into its territorial sea to conduct SAR operations: see Barnes (n 7) 53.  
46 For a history, see Barnes (n 7) 106–11. 
47 IMO, ‘Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea’ (20 May 2014) Res MSC.167(78) Annex 
34. 
48 IMO, ‘Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 as 
Amended’ (20 May 2004) Res MSC.153(78) ch 5 reg 33. 
49  E Papastavridis, The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas (Hart 2014), 297-300.  
50 S Trevisanut, ‘Is There a Right to be Rescued at Sea? A Constructive View’ (2014) Quest Intl L, 7. Cf 
Moreno-Lax (n 6).  
51  M Ratcovich, ‘The Concept of “Place of Safety”: Yet Another Self-Contained Maritime Rule or a 
Sustainable Solution to the Ever Controversial Question of Where to Disembark Migrants Rescued at 
Sea?’ (2015) 33 Aust YBIL 81. 
52 IMO, Res MSC.167(78), [6.12]–[6.18]. 
53  IMO, Res MSC.167(78), [6.17]. 
however, not precluding the entry into force of the amendments.54 And the humanitarian dimension 
of SAR and its intertwining with human rights obligations has, moreover, been forcefully recognised 
by the European Court of Human Rights in its Hirsi judgment.55 
Yet, even with these core obligations falling on individual Member States, the EU has moved to 
a central position in managing SAR, because of the perceived implications for border security.56 Border 
control and SAR activity have (operationally) merged, with the former gaining (practical) pre-eminence 
over the latter—in line with the allocation of powers in the EU Treaties.57 Indeed, ‘maritime search 
and rescue and disembarkation are the competence of the Member States [not Frontex or the EU]’.58 
The main function of the EU Coastguard is to coordinate operational cooperation between the 
Member States so as to reinforce the monitoring of the common external frontiers,59 with ‘saving the 
lives of migrants’ arising as a desirable by-product of maritime intervention.60  
SAR has been demoted to a second plane also due to the division of labour regarding the 
launching and running of joint operations. Although the EU Coastguard is supposedly just a facilitator 
of operational cooperation, it plays a leading role in initiating and approving joint activities, and in 
their planning, deployment, and strategic evaluation. This blurs the lines of responsibility between it 
and the Member States and creates uncertainty regarding attribution of conduct that may violate 
human rights.61 Their mandates are increasingly intermingled—although Member States remain ‘in 
principle’ responsible for carrying out border controls (and are exclusively competent to exercise 
force), the EU Coastguard enables efficient controls on the ground through intelligence provision, 
tactical coordination, and operational funding. A co-dependency emerges between the EU Coastguard 
and the Member States, with the former translating the ambitions of the latter into operational 
detail—the whole focus thus remaining on border security, rather than on SAR at sea. 
Joint missions may be launched at the request of a Member State, evaluated and ‘approved’ by 
the EU Coastguard.62 Article 15(4) of the Coastguard Regulation speaks of its faculty to ‘recommend’ 
to Member States the launch of joint operations or rapid border interventions.63 But in relation to 
                                                 
54  IMO Status of Ratifications (n 12). Malta’s objection means that it is not bound by the amendments. 
55  ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, Appl. 27765/09, 23 Feb. 2012. For analysis, see J Coppens, ‘The Law of the 
Sea and Human Rights in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, in Y Haeck, E Brems (eds) Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century (Springer 
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56  See V Moreno-Lax, ‘The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitization of Human Rights: The 
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58  Council of the EU, Doc 14612/13, 10 October 2013, 2 <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/oct/eu-
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59 EBCGR arts 1, 4, 8. 
60 European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) Regulation (EU) 1052/2013, [2013] OJ L295/11, 
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Borders?’ (2015) 24 European Security 454.  
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maritime operations, it appears that search and rescue per se cannot constitute the overarching 
objective of a joint mission. Although ‘some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and 
rescue at sea’,64 border surveillance remains the primary goal.65 This follows ‘[t]he objective of Union 
policy in the field’. While operations may contribute ‘to ensuring the protection and saving of lives’, 
their ultimate aspiration remains ‘to prevent unauthorised border crossings, to counter cross-border 
criminality and to apprehend…those persons who have crossed the border in an irregular manner’.66 
This does not mean the Member States and the EU Coastguard free themselves of their SAR and 
human rights obligations,67 but it requires that surveillance ‘be effective in preventing and 
discouraging persons from circumventing checks at border crossing points’.68 The bias is thus towards 
control and security, not SAR.69 
It therefore appears that it will only be ‘[d]uring a border surveillance operation at sea’ that ‘a 
situation may occur where it will be necessary to render assistance to persons found in distress’70—
SAR is thus framed as an incident of the patrolling mission. With that in mind, operational plans must 
contemplate a series of additional details, ‘in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
international instruments, governing [SAR] situations and…the protection of [human] rights’.71 These 
include rules on the identification and communication of cases of uncertainty, alert and distress; 
modalities of disembarkation; and the contact details of national authorities competent to adopt 
adequate follow-up measures.72 
In case persons are found to be in distress, Member States (not the EU Coastguard) ‘shall 
observe their obligation to render assistance’ and ‘ensure that their participating units comply with 
that obligation’. The EU Coastguard is not directly responsible for guaranteeing compliance with SAR 
obligations, but only to support EU norms by reinforcing, assessing, and coordinating the actions of 
Member States.73  
The 2014 Maritime Surveillance Regulation (MSR) provides, nonetheless, some guidance 
regarding SAR. In line with international obligations, it makes explicit that the nationality, status or 
circumstances in which the persons are found are irrelevant. Moreover, the existence of an explicit 
request for assistance is considered unnecessary.74 Other factors must also be taken into account for 
the determination of a SAR-relevant situation, including the seaworthiness of the vessel, the number 
and medical condition of persons on board, the availability of water, fuel and food supplies, the 
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absence of qualified crew and equipment, as well as the weather and sea conditions.75 The presence 
of pregnant women, minors, and asylum seekers may be decisive, as the special needs of vulnerable 
persons must be ‘addressed’ throughout the operation.76 In such circumstances, participating units 
must transmit all the relevant details to the SAR Centre responsible for the SAR zone concerned and 
put themselves at its disposal.77 Pending instructions, they must take all the necessary safety 
measures, avoiding any action ‘that might aggravate the situation or increase the chances of injury or 
loss of life’, even if the persons on board refuse to accept assistance.78 So, at the end of the day, EU 
law adds an extra layer of specification to the definition of ‘distress’ on top of the 2004 IMO 
amendments, complementing the international regime—if only in this incidental manner that 
subordinates the relevance of SAR to border security operations, arguably in disconformity with the 
humanitarian spirit of maritime conventions and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ in 
customary law.79 
Triton offers a key example of one recent Frontex/EU Coastguard-coordinated operation in the 
Mediterranean following this pattern of relegated SAR action.80 It was launched as a replacement to 
the Italian (humanitarian/military) Mare Nostrum operation, which rescued more than 130,000 
persons between October 2013 and October 2014,81 but with a much less ambitious remit.82 While 
Mare Nostrum had a proactive SAR component83—and was partly discontinued precisely because of 
its perceived ‘magnet’ effect on boat arrivals84—for Triton, ‘the focus…is primarily border 
management’.85 As the European Commission confirmed, ‘Frontex is neither a search and rescue body 
nor does it take up the functions of a Rescue Coordination Centre’.86 Its role is merely to ‘assist 
Member States to fulfil their obligations under international maritime law to render assistance to 
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2014). 
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persons in distress’.87 As such, it was in fact considered that Triton would ‘not replace or substitute 
Italian obligations’,88 even if Mare Nostrum had been dismantled. 
In May 2015, the revised operational plan of what has become Triton Plus was put forward to 
help Frontex ‘fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to Member States under 
pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea’.89 Yet, Frontex’s Executive Director has 
insisted that saving migrants’ lives ‘shouldn’t be’ the priority for patrols because this lies beyond the 
Agency’s mandate.90 The framing of SAR as an incident of frontier control is thus confirmed in the EU’s 
current approach to boat migration across the Mediterranean, distilling a securitised understanding 
thereof, with the foremost concern being border management rather than the protection of life at 
sea. 
C. Offshore Australia: Increasing Conflation of SAR with Border Security 
The Australian government has been even bolder in its attempts at subsuming SAR under border 
control operations. In fact, there appears to have been a deliberate attempt to conflate the two, in 
order to expand the government’s power to intercept, board and divert asylum seekers and migrants 
attempting to reach Australia by sea—in disregard of the applicable law of the sea rules on 
jurisdictional zones delimiting interdiction powers.91 While, on paper, the rules governing SAR 
activities are distinct to those that govern security-related interdiction activities, in practice, the line 
between the two regimes is purposely distorted.  
The Rescue Coordination Centre, within the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA),92 is 
the agency designated with the task of coordinating Australia’s SAR operations. The rules governing 
how SAR is to be planned and carried out are promulgated in the National Search and Rescue 
Manual.93 While the document contains extensive detail in relation to SAR procedures and techniques, 
it makes no specific reference to the meaning of a ‘place of safety’ or selecting a point of 
disembarkation (let alone in conformity with non-refoulement). There is some guidance in relation to 
the standard for ‘distress’, which is said to occur when a vessel requires ‘immediate assistance’ 
resulting from ‘grave or imminent danger’94––so, presumably, unseaworthiness alone, which is the 
typical characteristic of boat migrant vessels, will not per se trigger a SAR response. 
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Security and border control related maritime interdiction activities are coordinated by 
Australia’s Maritime Border Command (MBC).95 The government’s maritime enforcement powers are 
set out in the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (‘MPA’). Where a vessel is suspected of violating any 
Australian law, including immigration laws, the Act authorises the use of certain interdiction powers. 
These include boarding, obtaining information, searching, detaining, seizing and retaining things; and 
moving and detaining persons.96 The Act also makes it clear that authorization from a statutory officer 
for the exercise of maritime powers is not required where the exercise is to ensure the safety of the 
officers or any other person.97 At times, the Australian Government has also claimed that maritime 
interdiction operations are authorised under its non-statutory executive (or prerogative) power.98 
By comparison to the EU experience, there are no publicly available rules of engagement, 
regulations, or protocols in relation to Australia’s maritime enforcement activities. The only relevant 
publicly available resource is the Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA).99 This 
document sets out stakeholder roles in relation to eight civil maritime security threats, one of which 
is irregular maritime arrivals.  
In practice, it can be very difficult to distinguish which powers the government purports to be 
exercising when it intercepts and diverts irregular migrant vessels. Under current arrangements, 
AMSA’s Rescue Coordination Centre is the first point of contact for both maritime safety and maritime 
security incidents. Where the incident is of a security nature, the Rescue Coordination Centre informs 
the MBC, which then assumes responsibility for providing the response. The MBC coordinates 
interdiction activities using Australian Defence Force (ADF) or Australian Border Force (ABF) vessels.100 
In cases of SAR, the Rescue Coordination Centre coordinates vessels to carry out the rescue. These 
vessels could be commercial ships or boats operated by any Commonwealth or State or territory 
agency. Given the fact that the ADF and ABF boats are stationed in the regions most affected by boat 
migration, it is often one of these vessels that are deployed to carry out the SAR operation.101 It is also 
important to note that an operation that starts out as an interdiction could transform into a SAR 
operation and vice-versa, with authority for coordination switching between AMSA and the MBC 
accordingly.102 
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The functions of SAR and maritime interdiction have been further conflated as a result of 
Operation Sovereign Borders, launched in late 2013. The military-led initiative has the goal of stopping 
boats suspected of carrying irregular migrants from entering Australian territory.103 This is achieved 
by physically intercepting and deflecting their vessels. The entire operation is shrouded in secrecy, 
with the government adopting a policy of not commenting on ‘operational matters’ for security 
reasons.104 Given this secrecy, there is little information about how and where interdiction and push-
back operations occur and whether the government purports to be acting under its SAR or interdiction 
powers.  
The result is that it is difficult to assess whether Australia complies with its obligations under 
international law or, rather, whether it exploits SAR provisions to expand its interdiction authority 
beyond allocated jurisdictional zones. The final outcome—by contrast to the ‘relegated’ or ‘incidental 
SAR’ paradigm reigning in Europe—is a ‘conflated SAR’ model that confuses rescue at sea with border 
security objectives. 
III. THE EXPLANATORY PARADIGM: SECURITIZATION 
Although the international SAR regime has its own distinct requirements, processes, and 
institutions, the increasing linkage between this regime and migration control has begun to infuse SAR 
with similar characterizations and responses to those seen in relation to irregular migration and its 
portrayal as ‘a threat’.105 The basis for the shifting approach, away from the core focus of humanitarian 
assistance, is the use of a ‘securitization frame’, which assists in understanding why States take certain 
actions in response to boat migration.106 Securitization is the process whereby actors with sufficient 
authority identify existential threats to the State, society, or other particular object, and seek to 
implement extraordinary measures in response to the putative threat.107 
The arrival of boat migrants is considered to be a threat to the destination State in this 
scenario.108 The threat might be cast as a result of the unknown background of the individuals, who 
may be perceived to be existing or potential criminals or terrorists.109 But the threat may be perceived 
more broadly as somehow jeopardising the existing lifestyles, economy or cultures of the destination 
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State.110 The confluence (or subordination) of SAR with (or to) migration control results in boat 
migrants constituting a threat, irrespective of whether they were rescued from a situation of distress 
or have otherwise entered a country without authorization. 
Within the securitization frame, the actors who characterise the threat must have authority to 
speak about security and an audience that is receptive to how that threat is constructed.111 In 
Australia, one of the main political parties came to power in 2013 with a platform that included the 
mantra of ‘stop the boats’.112 In the EU, the European Coastguard was created with a mission ‘to 
integrate national border security systems of Member States against all kinds of threats that could 
happen at or through the external border of the Member States’.113 As indicated above in relation to 
EU practice, boat migration has been one of the threats identified as requiring a border security 
response. 
In implementing responses to a threat, a securitization frame may allow for drastic or atypical 
responses that prioritise ameliorating the security concerns. One example is seen in UN Security 
Council Resolution 2240 (2015), in which the Security Council authorises inspection of vessels on the 
high seas off the coast of Libya that are reasonably suspected of migrant smuggling or human 
trafficking.114 In making this decision,115 the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, which concerns threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.116 Despite 
the fact that a large number of deaths occurring during sea voyages across the Mediterranean have 
been attributed to unseaworthiness of the vessels, and hence might attract a response under the SAR 
regime, the Resolution focuses on the securitized perspective of people smuggling and human 
trafficking. The only mention of SAR is in the preambular paragraphs, where the Security Council 
recalls the existence of the SAR Convention, but, then again, framing loss of life at sea as a ‘threat to 
international peace and security’. 
The increasing conflation of SAR with migration control (as in Australia), or the subordination of 
the SAR regime to migration control rules and processes (as in the EU), is highly problematic. The 
securitization of SAR runs the risk of setting a crisis tone and prompting short-term responses that 
emphasise State security.117 As discussed further below, the practice of the EU and Australia presents 
compelling examples of securitizing SAR in the context of boat migration, which has distorted the 
primary humanitarian object of the regime. In both settings, although there is rhetoric in relation to 
saving lives at sea, the commitment to human rights obligations is lacking in reality, once effective 
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control is being exercised over boat migrants.118 Instead, legal frameworks, government institutions, 
and actual practices indicate an emphasis on border control and hence national security that 
overshadows—if not altogether sidelines—SAR in the context of boat migration.  
Against this background, this Part explores the commonalities that exist between European and 
Australian experiences and the consequences of securitization. Specifically, it addresses the increasing 
militarization in SAR responses, the difficulties arising from differing interpretations of relevant legal 
terms, the lack of transparency and accountability, which compound the first two trends, the moves 
towards criminalising humanitarian assistance, and the impediments to effective cooperation around 
SAR. 
A. Militarization 
The response to boat migration in both the EU and Australia is now marked by a trend towards 
increasing militarization of on-water responses to migrant vessels. Australia’s Operation Sovereign 
Borders is a military-led initiative that operates under the command of an Army General.119 The 
Maritime Border Command tasked with coordinating maritime interdiction activities, while technically 
a civil maritime security authority, is commanded by a Rear Admiral seconded from Defence, who is 
responsible for coordinating assets and personnel from both the Australian Border Force (ABF) and 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). The ADF’s contribution to Operation Sovereign Borders is codenamed 
Operation RESOLUTE.120 It involves the deployment of up to 800 ADF personnel at sea, in the air and 
on land, who work alongside personnel from the ABF.121 Resources allocated to the operation include 
Air Force AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Navy Armidale Class Patrol Boats, and two Navy Major 
Fleet Units.122 
In July 2017, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection confirmed that Australia 
had intercepted and turned back 30 boats carrying a total of 765 asylum seekers since the 
commencement of Operation Sovereign Borders.123 Details about individual operations were not 
provided. Media reports indicate that the majority of these incidents involved interdicting Indonesian 
vessels carrying boat migrants and returning them to the edge of Indonesian territorial waters, 
although more recent incidents have included turn-backs to Vietnam and Sri Lanka, rising high risks of 
refoulement.124 The precise locations of the interdictions are unclear. Some boat migrants have been 
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towed back in their original vessels, while others have been transferred to custom-built orange 
lifeboats stocked with food, water, and medical supplies.125 It appears that the orange lifeboats have 
now been replaced by a fleet of Vietnamese-built wooden vessels resembling Asian fishing boats.126  
The response in Europe has been similarly militarised—and heedless of non-refoulement and 
other human rights obligations. The European Council’s Ten-Point Action Plan, adopted to implement 
the European Agenda on Migration at the outbreak of the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, proposed the 
establishment of an EU-led naval force operation (EUNAVFOR) to operate in parallel to Frontex-led 
activities.127 This was not intended to buttress SAR but rather ‘to better contain [sic] the growing flows 
of illegal migration’128  
EUNAVFOR Med was launched the following month.129 The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs 
described the ultimate goal of the operation as the ‘war on smugglers’.130 Several operational phases 
have been distinguished: the first for surveillance and assessment; the second for the search and 
seizure of migrant boats, including for the ‘disposal of vessels…preferably before use’ and the 
apprehension of smugglers on high seas; a third phase taking place within Libyan jurisdiction; and a 
final phase for completion and handing over of responsibilities to the Libyan Coastguard, once 
sufficient progress had been achieved.  
The start-up phase, Operation Sophia, was launched in June 2015.131 Yet, to launch phases 2 
and 3, it was acknowledged that the EU lacked jurisdiction, as these entailed extraterritorial recourse 
to military force.132 Consequently, diplomatic representations were made at the bilateral level to 
persuade Libya and Tunisia, and at UN level to obtain the authorization of the Security Council.133 The 
latter resulted in UNSC Resolution 2240, on 9 October 2015, authorising Member States ‘to use all 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances’ to ‘inspect’, ‘seize’, and possibly ‘dispose of’ 
migrant vessels (including inflatable boats, rafts, and dinghies), so as to ‘disrupt the organised criminal 
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enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking’, but only with respect to ‘the 
situation of smuggling and trafficking on the high seas off the coast of Libya’.134 
The fears expressed by the EU Defence Chiefs, when consulted on the design of the operation 
in documents filtered to the press by Wikileaks, are worth noting. They anticipated that EUNAVFOR 
Med was doomed to fail, and that it would further destabilise the region and divert migration to 
alternative (more dangerous) routes, thus paradoxically intensifying smuggling and trafficking 
activity.135 The clear evidence of spiralling fatality rates in the Mediterranean points, precisely, to the 
inadequacy of replacing SAR operations with law-enforcement or military missions unfit for 
purpose.136 
Nonetheless, EUNAVFOR Med’s mandate has been extended and expanded to help implement 
the arms embargo on Libya and train the Libyan Navy and Coastguard,137 so that they can ‘decrease 
irregular migration from Libya’.138 The long-term aim of this approach is to create a functioning Libyan 
capacity to prevent migrants from leaving the country139—ignoring the rights to leave and to asylum 
recognised in international and EU law.140 Crucially, this implies that ‘[i]f migrant boats intercepted in 
Libyan waters by Libyan vessels are taken back to Libyan shores…the EU non-refoulement obligations 
would not be triggered’.141 Ultimately, the goal is for pre-emptive take-backs to replace SAR,142 shifting 
the responsibility for refugee and migrant flows to Libya.143 
There is a similar approach adopted in the Aegean, where NATO launched an operation similar 
to EUNAVFOR Med in February 2016 along Turkish shores. Just like the Frontex missions and Operation 
Sophia, its goal is ‘to [contribute to] the international efforts to stem the illegal trafficking and illegal 
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migration in the Aegean’, in the words of NATO Secretary General.144 The operation is formally only 
‘tasked to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in the Aegean’.145 
It does not have a SAR or border control competence. However, when encountered with distress 
situations, it has been agreed that assets will proceed to the rescue of those concerned, returning 
them directly to Turkey146—whatever the impact on fundamental freedoms. The conclusion of the EU-
Turkey deal in March 2016, whereby Turkey must impede boat migrants’ exit and accept the 
readmission of all those arriving irregularly on EU soil in exchange for financial and other support, 
facilitates this course.147 Returns to Turkey, through disembarkations performed upon rescue or 
interdiction by NATO assets, are being conducted in disregard of non-refoulement,148 which should 
determine the choice of ‘place of safety’, according to IMO Guidelines and human rights law, as further 
detailed below.149 The full implications of SAR obligations are being discounted, if not instrumentalised 
for security purposes. 
The situation has apparently been ‘normalised’ after the launch of Operation Sea Guardian in 
November 2016,150 and the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration,151 where Member States seem to have 
endorsed NATO’s perspective and decided to join efforts. NATO warships are thus now helping the 
EU’s cause to stem the flow of mostly Syrian asylum seekers across the Eastern Mediterranean. 
According to the Greek Defence Minister, ‘[t]he prevention of refugee flows [sic] with NATO ships will 
continue as long as there are prospective illegal migrants or refugees [sic] on the other side of the 
Aegean’.152 And so, arguably, with NATO’s involvement in migration control, ‘a dangerous shift toward 
militarization of a humanitarian crisis’ has been consolidated in the Mediterranean Sea.153 
B. Disembarkation, ‘Place of safety’, and Non-refoulement 
One of the key issues that arises during SAR activities involving boat migrants is the selection of 
an appropriate location where rescuees can be disembarked. This issue was partially addressed in the 
2004 SOLAS amendments and associated IMO Guidelines, but significant ambiguities remain.154 
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The EU has sought to address this in the 2014 Maritime Surveillance Regulation (MSR) by 
articulating modalities for disembarkation following the rescue or interception of vessels in the 
context of Frontex-coordinated operations. These must be agreed in advance and inserted in the 
operational plan of the relevant deployment. As a rule, where interdiction occurs in the territorial 
waters or contiguous zone, disembarkation should normally take place in the coastal Member State.155 
But, if rescue or interception occurs on the high seas, the preferred place of disembarkation is ‘in the 
third country from which the vessel is assumed to have departed’.156 Where disembarkation follows a 
SAR incident, it is for the relevant Rescue Coordination Centre to identify an appropriate ‘place of 
safety’—excluding ports in non-participating Member States, unless they consent.157 
The MSR—based on the IMO Guidelines but codifying them into hard law for EU law purposes—
provides that a ‘place of safety’ shall be a ‘location where rescue operations are considered to 
terminate and where the survivors’ safety of life is not threatened’; a place ‘where their basic human 
needs can be met’. Moreover, in accordance with human rights principles, it shall also be a location 
where protection and compliance with the principle of non-refoulement is guaranteed.158 Unlike the 
duty to rescue, non-refoulement ‘shall apply to all measures taken by Member States or the Agency’, 
making the EU Coastguard explicitly bound by attendant obligations.159 
As a result, the MSR contemplates that interdicted or rescued persons cannot be ‘disembarked 
in’, nor can they be ‘forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the authorities of’, a 
country where there are serious risks of being subjected to persecution or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, whether directly or by onward removal to another country.160 Therefore, 
when considering disembarkation in a third country, the prevailing situation there must be taken into 
account. Information derived from a wide range of sources is essential. It is, however, unclear what 
the significance of ‘the existence of agreements and projects on migration and asylum carried out in 
accordance with Union law and through Union funds’ may be in this assessment, but it is one of the 
factors contemplated in the MSR.161 Also, although the identification and assessment of personal 
identity and circumstances has to be undertaken before removal, informing the persons concerned of 
their destination so they can oppose it on refoulement grounds, there is no provision for procedural 
safeguards, remedies, or judicial oversight to guarantee compliance with the principle in practice.162 
This contravenes human rights standards, as per Hirsi and related case law.163 
As advanced as the MSR provisions may be in certain respects, particularly as they represent a 
regional arrangement followed by 28 Member States, they suffer from an additional key limitation. 
They apply only to EU Coastguard-coordinated operations and thus leave untouched any 
arrangements regarding unilateral action or collaborative conduct undertaken outside the Frontex 
framework. Arguably, these exclusions encompass the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia and actions 
taken under the auspices of NATO, leaving an important gap in effective protection, considering 
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developments on the ground—including non-assistance and abandonment at sea164—and the fact 
that it remains disputed whether EU non-refoulement provisions have an extraterritorial reach beyond 
Member States’ domain.165 
There is currently no comparable regional agreement between Australia and its neighbours on 
the issue of disembarkation. As the MV Pinar and MV Tampa incidents demonstrate (see Part I), 
governments may be reluctant to permit the disembarkation of rescued asylum seekers into their 
territory and may attempt to deflect responsibility to other jurisdictions. This can create uncertainty 
and discourage commercial vessels from participating in SAR activities. It also prevents Australian 
Government vessels from carrying out SAR in Indonesian waters, as it could result in Australia having 
to assume responsibility for disembarkation. The importance of dealing with the disembarkation issue 
in the Asia-Pacific region was raised at the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People 
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and related Transnational Crime held in March 2016.  The Ministerial 
Declaration adopted at the conference recognises the importance of coordinating procedures for 
rescue at sea and calls on participating governments to ‘work to identify more predictable 
disembarkation options’.166 To date, there have been no concrete proposals. 
Australia has also had cause to contemplate disembarkation at a ‘place of safety’ and the extent 
to which this duty is affected by considerations of non-refoulement. Regardless of whether the 
purported basis of an interception is SAR or security-related maritime interdiction, under Australian 
law, once a vessel is under the control of Australian authorities, the Australian Government has a 
responsibility to deliver the rescuees to a ‘place of safety’.167  Recent actions by Australian authorities 
appear to flout this requirement. While the lack of transparency around push-back operations 
(elaborated upon in the next section) makes a definitive assessment difficult, it is hard to conceive 
how leaving migrant vessels on the edge of Indonesian territorial waters could be viewed as delivery 
to a ‘place of safety’.168 This is regardless of whether they are aboard their original vessel or have been 
transferred to lifeboats or other vessels provided by the Australian authorities. In both instances, the 
migrants are left to navigate a potentially perilous sea voyage on their own. Similar actions under 
Operation Relex, providing a point of comparison, reportedly resulted in loss of life.169 
These actions have been possible because of the lack of a clear definition of ‘a place of safety’ 
in Australian law. Neither the National Search and Rescue Manual or the Maritime Powers Act refer 
to the specific circumstances of asylum seekers and the need to protect against refoulement. In fact, 
following the passage of Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the 
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) (‘Legacy Caseload Act)’, consideration of such factors is 
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explicitly prohibited in certain contexts.170 The amendments stipulate that when exercising maritime 
powers, an authorising officer is not required to consider Australia’s international obligations or the 
international obligations or domestic law of another country.171 Additionally, the amendments 
stipulate that authorization of maritime powers under the Act is not invalid even if inconsistent with 
Australia’s international obligations.172 As such, there are no clear legal safeguards in place to ensure 
that Australia does not breach its non-refoulement obligations by returning a person to a place where 
they face persecution contrary to the Refugee Convention, or to a situation where they are in danger 
of death, torture, or other unlawful mistreatment.173 
However, these amendments do not necessarily preclude an expansive interpretation of a 
‘place of safety’ under the Maritime Powers Act (‘MPA’). The Legacy Caseload Act did not remove the 
requirement that a ‘maritime officer must not place…a person in a place, unless the officer is satisfied, 
on reasonable grounds, that it is safe for the person to be in that place’.174 The breadth of this 
requirement was addressed by a number of the justices of the Australian High Court in CPCF v MIBP. 
The case was brought on behalf of a Tamil plaintiff who was part of a group of 157 Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers intercepted and detained at sea by Australian authorities for almost one month. The challenge 
was dismissed, with a majority of the court finding the detention lawful under the Maritime Powers 
Act. The facts before the court did not give rise to any issues of refoulement (the asylum seekers had 
eventually been transferred to the Australian run Regional Processing Centre in Nauru). A number of 
the justices nevertheless indicated a willingness to interpret the meaning of a ‘place of safety’ broadly, 
as encompassing similar protections to the non-refoulement obligations of the Refugee Convention 
and other human rights instruments.175 For example, Hayne and Bell JJ stated, in terms similar to 
French CJ, that: 
[t]he reference in s 74 to a person being ‘safe’ in a place must be read as meaning safe from risk 
of physical harm. A decision-maker who considers whether he or she is satisfied, on reasonable 
grounds, that it is safe for a person to be in a place must ask and answer a different question 
from that inferentially imposed by the Refugees Convention. But there is a very considerable 
factual overlap between the two inquiries. Many who fear persecution for a Convention reason 
fear for their personal safety in their country of nationality.176 
Kiefel J took a different approach, finding that s 74 only required that a point of disembarkation 
for a person is ‘in its immediate physical aspects… safe’.177 It did not require that a maritime officer be 
satisfied that place is one in which the person will not face a real risk of harm more generally.178 The 
matter left unresolved, this is an issue that will no doubt be explored further in future litigation.  
As things stand, there is currently no guarantee under Australian law of a reading of ‘delivery to 
a place of safety’ in line with the prohibition of refoulement, while in Europe procedural safeguards 
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are, in turn, insufficient to secure such result in practice. This arguably renders maritime operations in 
both regions legally unsustainable as currently practiced. 
C. Lack of Transparency and Accountability 
The securitization of SAR and its conflation with/subordination to security-related interdiction 
activities in Europe and Australia has resulted in a lack a transparency and accountability. This 
development, while unwelcome, is unsurprising because security operations are routinely shrouded 
in secrecy to avoid public scrutiny and the potential compromising of successful operations. 
In Australia, as noted above, Operation Sovereign Borders operates under a veil of silence. The 
government has sought to justify its decision not to comment on ‘on-water operational matters’ on 
the ground of national security and because such disclosure would benefit ‘the people smugglers and 
their business model’.179 The secrecy has been extended to SAR operations. Since the commencement 
of the operation, AMSA has stopped posting shipping broadcasts requesting assistance on its 
website.180 Ships involved in SAR activities receive direct communication from the Rescue 
Coordination Centre, but details of the activities are not released to the public. This secrecy makes it 
difficult to assess the extent to which Australian authorities are conforming to their obligations under 
the SAR regime, as well as under the Refugee Convention and human rights instruments. 
Similar secrecy applies in recent EU interdiction activities carried out behind the shield of ‘EU 
security’.181 A recent application for disclosure of the Operational Plan and Evaluation Report of 
Frontex-led Operation Hera in the period 2012–2015 in Western Africa and around the Canary Islands, 
submitted in 2016 by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), provides a 
telling example. Frontex purported to justify its extensive redaction of the Operational Plan by 
reference to ‘public security’ considerations, including a list of potential fundamental rights violations 
within Frontex activities.182 The argument is particularly inappropriate because it impedes any 
accountability of the Agency. 
In Europe, channels of democratic oversight exist, but remain weak.183 Since 2011, Frontex has 
been obliged to formulate and implement a (non-legally binding) Fundamental Rights Strategy to 
ensure that its operations fully respect fundamental rights.184 The European Parliament has exerted 
limited control through budgetary procedures.185 Moreover, the EBCG Regulation now provides that 
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requested, and ‘report to it regularly’ thereafter (art 68), which may improve the current opacity. 
Nevertheless, for the time being, the information released to the public on Frontex or EU 
Coastguard activities tends to be superficial and incomplete. The structure of general reports was 
revised in 2008 and the level of detail noticeably decreased.186 According to the Agency, the purpose 
of general reports is actually to provide ‘a broad overview of activities…and highlight individual 
operational…successes’,187 which leaves limited space for genuine external inspection. What is more, 
under the present Coastguard Regulation, ‘communication activities shall not be detrimental to 
[Coastguard] tasks’, which provides a basis for the Agency’s discretionary release of information, 
including selective redaction of documentation on vague security grounds, as the ECCHR case 
demonstrates.188  
It is the linkage between SAR with issues of migration control and border security, coupled with 
the absence of independent, comprehensive monitoring mechanisms,189 that have allowed both the 
EU and Australia to diminish transparency of strategic decisions and on-water operations. The 
resulting reduction of the quality and opportunity for democratic oversight can thus be related with 
an underlying securitisation paradigm.  
D. Cooperation and Commodification 
States are reluctant to engage in SAR operations involving boat migrants because of the 
responsibilities that may arise in relation to determining asylum applications, as exemplified by the 
second of our two rescue tales in Part I, the MV Pinar incident. This concern is compounded by 
ambiguity surrounding key elements of the international SAR regime—in particular the meaning of 
‘distress’, ‘place of safety’, and the selection of a point of disembarkation. The importance of this issue 
is widely acknowledged, but attempts to address it have fallen short to date.190 The 2004 SOLAS 
amendments require State parties to cooperate to ensure that masters are relieved of their 
obligations to assist ‘with minimum further deviation from the ship’s intended voyage’, but they do 
not go as far as mandating specific modalities for disembarkation.191 EU norms are more detailed and 
prescriptive, but only apply to EU Coastguard-led operations, as pointed out above. Their full 
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development in terms of identification and referral protocols in line with SAR standards, international 
human rights and refugee law has not been achieved.  
In the absence of more detailed international rules, such as new IMO Guidelines or a further 
reform of the maritime Conventions, it is up to individual States to enter into agreements with 
neighbouring countries as to how best to deal with this issue. To date, such cooperation has not been 
forthcoming. While shiprider and similar agreements have been concluded for law-enforcement 
purposes,192 States appear to be unwilling to participate in any arrangement that would result in them 
assuming (greater or any) responsibilities for rescued boat migrants. Cooperation is viewed as a zero-
sum game, resulting in some States reducing their obligations at the cost of others taking on a greater 
burden.193 
Cooperation around law-enforcement and securitization of borders may also be characterised 
as a zero-sum game. When States undertake actively to prevent the passage of boat migrants to 
another jurisdiction, they are in effect shifting the flow (and related burden) of those persons. 
However, States value such cooperation to the extent that they are willing to provide substantial 
payment or other inducements to partners.194 The reality is that saving lives does not have the same 
priority.  
One can observe cooperation becoming commodified in this way in the Mediterranean,195 
where the replacement of SAR with law-enforcement and militarised border control efforts has 
become widespread. Some speak of a ‘world of cooperative deterrence’196 or the ‘rise of consensual 
containment’ in this regard,197 conceptualising an ever-expanding trend that infringes the most basic 
rights of boat migrants.  
The EU tends to avoid unilateral action. Rather, the organization—via the EU Coastguard, 
EUNAVFOR Med, and individual Member States—trades in trust, exchanging funds and assets for pull-
backs and border-enforcement capacity of transit countries with cooperation in the containment of 
flows and the fight against irregular migration.198 The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
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the Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, and the related partnership with NATO, analysed 
above, demonstrates this strategic, selective approach to multilateral trust and collaboration with 
neighbours in the region.199 The key drawback of this instrumentalization is its impact on SAR and 
human rights protection, which have been fundamentally distorted and made into a tool in the arsenal 
of the ‘war on smugglers’ across the Mediterranean.200 
Australia has achieved mixed results in enlisting the cooperation of neighbouring States in its 
interdiction and push-back operations. Sri Lanka has successfully been engaged to collaborate in joint 
interceptions and take back procedures, as well as to disrupt refugee departures before they occur. 
Australia has provided equipment to Sri Lanka to assist them in carrying out these tasks, including two 
Bay Class patrol vessels gifted to the Sri Lankan navy.201 Cooperation has also been forthcoming from 
Vietnam, which has accepted returns of its nationals intercepted at sea on route to Australia.202 
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia is somewhat more complicated.203 While the two nations have 
a long history of cooperating around border control issues, particularly through their role as joint 
chairs of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, 
Australia’s securitised approach to boat migration has eroded trust and placed significant strain on 
the relationship.204 So much so that Australian authorities unilaterally return boats to the edge of 
Indonesian territorial waters without consultation with, or approval from, the Indonesian 
Government.205 Relations have been further damaged by revelations that Australian Navy Customs 
vessels had repeatedly ventured into Indonesian waters without authorisation as part of patrols 
relating to Operation Sovereign Borders,206 as well as allegations in 2015 that cash payments had been 
made by Australian authorities to induce Indonesian crew members of a migrant vessel to return to 
Indonesia.207 In both instances, the actions were viewed by Indonesia as a significant breach of its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.208 This growing distrust has serious flow-on effects for the 
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operation of SAR in the region, and makes reaching agreement on key issues like modalities of 
disembarkation all the more difficult.  
Australia has had success in commodifying and outsourcing other elements of its international 
responsibilities, particularly where it has been unable to successfully push-back asylum seekers at sea. 
Under Australian law, persons that attempt to reach Australia by boat are barred from applying for 
asylum or ever settle in Australia.209 They are instead transferred to facilities in Manus Island, Papua 
New Guinea or Nauru, to have their protection claims assessed under the domestic laws of those 
countries.210 Cooperation from PNG and Nauru was secured through substantial cash inducements 
delivered through Australia’s aid program, and payments covering the costs of building and running 
the detention centres where rescued/intercepted asylum seekers are placed on arrival.211 The facility 
on Manus Island is set to close on 31st October 2017,212 following a decision of the Supreme Court of 
PNG declaring the detention of asylum seekers illegal.213 But there are currently no plans to amend or 
rescind the arrangement with Nauru. Cambodia has also been recruited to resettle a handful of the 
refugees processed on Nauru. Only six have so far volunteered for the program, and, of these, four 
decided instead to return to their home countries, citing unbearable living conditions.214 This has come 
at the cost of approximately AUD$55 million to the Australian government in additional aid and direct 
payment for resettlement services.215  
As in the case of the EU, the intention of these arrangements is to ‘outsource’ Australia’s 
international obligations with respect to refugees and migrants to poorer neighbours in the region.216 
Both Australia and the EU seem to be under the impression that cooperation in this guise releases 
them of any international responsibility. Yet, in most cases, the States concerned will still be 
responsible under general customary law,217 either through exercising effective control (such as 
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Australia’s direct involvement in offshore processing) or through complicity, direction, and/or control 
of internationally wrongful acts committed by the third country (as in the case of the EU and Italy’s 
support to pull-backs by Libya).218 What neither region appears to realise is that, pursuant to the pacta 
sunt servanda principle, ‘every treaty in force [eg the Refugee Convention or instruments of human 
rights law] is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’.219 Once 
concluded, it may be denounced—if the text so allows—but cannot be ‘contracted out’ via subsequent 
(if cooperative) arrangements.220 In those circumstances, the very wording of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties indicates that responsibility ‘may arise for a State from the conclusion or 
application of a [subsequent] treaty [however named]221 the provisions of which are incompatible with 
its obligations towards another State under another [prior] treaty’.222 Otherwise, the opposite would 
mean that ‘the guarantees of [eg refugee and human rights conventions] could be limited or excluded 
at will thereby depriving [them] of [their] peremptory character and … practical and effective nature 
…’.223 
E. Criminalisation 
The void left by official authorities, in terms of SAR coverage in the Mediterranean, has been filled by 
civil society organisations undertaking private rescues. Especially since the outbreak of the ‘crisis’ in 
2015, several NGOs have been formed with the purpose of locating and assisting migrant boats in the 
Central Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.224 Their intervention has very much changed the 
landscape, to the extent that they have been recorded to perform up to half of the total rescues 
undertaken.225 This, in turn, has been perceived to create a ‘call effect’ or ‘pull factor’, facilitating the 
deeds of human traffickers and migrant smugglers.226 Although Frontex has denied direct 
accusations,227 these have been reported by the press228 and have translated, at least on two 
occasions, on the pressing of charges against NGOs.229 Proemaid, a group of Spanish fire-fighters 
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operating in Lesbos, has been accused of ‘attempted’ human trafficking under Greek law, and there is 
an open case against the German Jugend Rettet in Italy.230  
Although the European Commission has denied any need to revise the Facilitators Directive to 
unambiguously de-criminalise humanitarian assistance under EU law,231 there is a solid consensus in 
the literature,232 that the EU instrument is not in full alignment with the Smuggling Protocol,233 as it 
omits that for the perpetration of the crime of facilitation of irregular entry into a Member State there 
needs to be an economic gain234—on top of a mens rea or criminal intent and a link to organised 
transborder mafias.235 The Travaux Préparatoires make clear that the reference in the definition of 
migrant smuggling in Article 3 of the Protocol to ‘a financial or other material benefit’ was included 
precisely ‘to emphasize that the intention was to include the activities of organized criminal groups 
acting for profit, but to exclude the activities of those who provided support to migrants for 
humanitarian reasons’. The Protocol’s aim was not to punish NGOs.236  
By contrast with the EU situation, to date, there have been no NGO groups involved in active 
search and rescue missions targeting asylum seekers and migrants off Australia’s coast. If such 
operations were to take place, the crew of the NGO vessels may be liable for prosecution under 
Australia’s strict anti-people smuggling laws. First introduced in 1999, the anti-people smuggling 
provisions have progressively broadened in the intervening years.237 As in the EU, there is no 
requirement of ‘a financial or other material benefit’.238 All that is required is that a person ‘organises 
or facilitates’ the entry (or proposed entry) of a migrant who has no right to enter Australia.239 Where 
there are more than five migrants involved, this constitutes an aggravated offence with a penalty of 
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up to 20 years imprisonment.240 Reforms introduced in 2011 make it clear that it is immaterial whether 
Australia owes, or may owe, the migrants protection obligations under the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol, or other human rights instruments.241 Persons who donate money to NGOs involved in 
search and rescue of asylum seekers and migrants at sea may also face criminal charges for the offence 
of providing material support or resources to a person or organisation involved in people smuggling.242 
It may be possible, however, for those involved in humanitarian rescue to rely on the defence of 
‘sudden and extraordinary emergency’, which is included in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).243 This 
defence will be successful where the accused can show that they were obliged to commit an offence 
by reason of some extraordinary emergency. It is arguable that the rendering assistance to persons in 
distress at sea would meet this requirement.244 However, hitherto, this defence remains largely 
untested in Australian courts.245  
The criminalisation of people smuggling, and in particular the enactment of broad offences 
which go well beyond what is authorised and required under the Smuggling Protocol, are yet another 
manifestation of the securitization of SAR in the EU and Australia. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The fundamental humanitarian purpose of SAR is under threat because of the securitization 
and, increasingly, the militarization and criminalization of boat migration. The practice of the 
European Coastguard and individual EU Member States, as well as Australia, demonstrates that the 
line between SAR and security-related interdiction has been increasingly blurred and manipulated. 
The Australian regime ostensibly intends to identify whether a vessel is one requiring a SAR response 
or is an instance of unlawful entry, and different agencies are mobilised accordingly. However, if an 
Australian asset is deployed for SAR, the operation falls under the Maritime Powers Act and secrecy 
requirements follow. In the EU, the Coastguard is primarily focused on border-enforcement 
operations, which have been increasingly securitized as a response to people smuggling and human 
trafficking. This characterization has been reinforced by Security Council Resolution 2240 (2015) and 
formal collaboration with EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia and NATO Sea Guardian patrols. In these 
examples, the SAR regime is either relegated or merged into a law-enforcement response to people 
smuggling. Instead, the critical task of identifying a vessel in distress should be the catalyst for 
determining whether the response should be directed through the SAR regime or whether the vessel 
should be subjected to an interdiction measure for migration control purposes. 
Securitization is also eroding the spirit of cooperation that is so essential to the effectiveness of 
the SAR regime. Rescues at sea often involve authorities from multiple jurisdictions. It is common for 
a rescue to be carried out by a merchant vessel flagged in State A, coordinated by authorities from 
State B, and end with disembarkation in State C. Any perception that one or more of the parties may 
not carry out their respective obligations in good faith is a disincentive for the other parties involved. 
Securitization of SAR in one jurisdiction can also place pressure on other jurisdictions to follow suit. 
This is the result of a perception that a robust SAR apparatus may act as a ‘pull factor’ for boat 
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migrants, despite evidence denying such effect.246 Hence, there is a risk of a ‘race to the bottom’ as 
States prioritise security over saving lives at sea in a bid to divert irregular migrant flows to other 
jurisdictions.247 This situation underscores the need to recover the humanitarian essence of SAR and 
shed the regime of its securitized and militarised connotations. SAR should be understood as an end 
in itself, not as a means to prevent irregular migration at the service of anti-smuggling strategies. 
At least since the Corfu Channel case, it has been known that ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’ still adhere in situations of high security concern, particularly where human lives are at 
stake.248 In adopting a securitization frame for responding to boat migration, States still retain core 
responsibilities in how they carry out law enforcement operations. In particular, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has recognised that considerations of humanity apply in the law of the 
sea, and even law enforcement operations must not travel beyond what is a reasonable and 
proportionate use of force.249 These standards must be borne in mind in the type of actions taken in 
response to boat migration. In the treatment of boat migrants, States must recall that they ‘are 
required to fulfil their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, and that 
considerations of due process of law must be applied in all circumstances’.250 
It is important to remember that the SAR regime is just one of a number of overlapping 
international legal regimes governing the power of States to deal with boat migrants at sea. Refugee 
law, international human rights law, the law of the sea, and the human smuggling and trafficking 
frameworks are all relevant in this regard. States often deal with these regimes in a fragmented 
manner,251 cherry picking provisions that allow them to justify a securitized approach to protecting 
State interests.252 Further research on how these regimes intersect, and how they can be integrated 
in a mutually reinforcing manner, may provide the key to recovering the humanitarian dimension of 
SAR.253 In such a conception, the obligations of humanity extended to those in peril at sea would be 
blind as to their identity as lone yachtsmen from the developed world or ‘huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free’.254 
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